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abstract
Recent debate in the intersection between philosophy and cognitive sciences have underlined the 
relevance of emotions in our lives. Emotions seem to play several different roles: from our inner and 
personal experience of the world, especially in all its alleged value aspects, to our relations to others. Yet, 
philosophical and scientific debate has not reached a consensus on what emotions are and on their specific 
contribution to our personal and social lives.
In this introductory chapter we present the different debates on emotions this issue focuses on and we 
briefly summarize the papers collected here.
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The present issue of Phenomenology and Mind “Emotions, Normativity, and Social Life” contains 
a selection of papers presented at San Raffaele Spring School of Philosophy (SRSSP) 2016 both 
by invited speakers and by contributors selected through double-blind peer review. Moreover, 
it includes papers that were selected for presentation but whose authors could not attend 
SRSSP 2016. 
SRSSP was held at Vita-Salute San Raffaele University in Milan in June, 6th – 8th, 2016. It was 
organized by the research centers CeSEP, CRESA, and PERSONA of the Faculty of Philosophy 
and it also received support from the Faculty and from the Ph.D. program. 
Recent debate in the intersection between philosophy and cognitive sciences have underlined 
the relevance of emotions in our lives. Emotions seem to play several different roles: from 
our inner and personal experience of the world, especially in all its alleged value aspects, to 
our relations to others. As for the former, the way we perceive the world and understand it 
is deeply influenced by our emotions. As for the latter, several researches have shown that 
emotional engagement with others is crucial both for understanding them and their states 
of mind and for building a relation with them. Just to provide a few paradigmatic examples 
of this interpersonal role, one can think of the constitution and maintenance of the bond 
between a newborn and his or her primary care-giver as an emotional one. Similarly, research 
on moral dilemmas have underlined that emotions play a crucial role in what we decide to 
do or to avoid doing (Greene et al. 2001). Yet, besides these roles, philosophical and scientific 
debate has not reached a consensus on what emotions are and on their specific contribution to 
our lives. There is great amount of data on the fact that they play a role, but what exactly that 
role is or what relation emotions entertain with other human faculties and abilities is not yet 
clear. Furthermore, the epistemological status of emotions is controversial.
Moreover, theories of emotions constitute a relevant attempt to bring empirical work to bear 
on philosophical theorizing, so providing the touchstone for interdisciplinary analysis.
Some of the more interesting debates concerning emotions focus on their role in 
moral and political theory, on their relation to language and hate speech, on their role 
in intersubjectivity – both in typical development and in pathologies –, and on our 
emotional self-understanding. Focus on each of these dimensions provides a more detailed 
understanding of what emotions actually are and of how they guide our lives.
San Raffaele 
Spring School of 
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12
FRANCESCA FORLÈ, SARAH SONGHORIAN
Within this framework, papers have been selected to contribute to one of the following 
sections:
– Theories of Emotions
What are emotions? What relationships do they entertain with perception, thought, and 
rationality on the one hand, and with their bodily and social expressions on the other? The 
aim of this section is to focus on these topics, trying to contribute to the contemporary debate 
on the ontological and epistemological status of emotions (Frijda 1986, 1988; Goldie 2000; 
Nussbaum 2001; Prinz 2004; Whiting 2011) and on their role in our personal and social life 
(Gallagher 2001, Zahavi 2014). 
– Emotions, Morality, and Political Theory
The debate in morality and in political theory on whether emotions do and should play a role 
in our decision-making has been crucial for centuries. New life has been given to this debate 
by the general renaissance of emotional theories linked in particular to psychological and 
social research. The questions guiding this section are: What emotional constructs or abilities 
– if any – play a role in our moral and political understanding of ourselves, of others, and of 
the world surrounding us? What consequences can derive from an emotional understanding 
of morality and political theory – that is, are emotions a good candidate for explaining them? 
What specific emotions – if any – constitute a touchstone for political and moral decision-
making? Are emotions – or should they be – the only mechanism to pass moral and political 
judgment or is there or should there be something else too?
– Emotions, Language, and Hate Speech
The debate on hate speech and slurs underlines how language can convey emotions and 
phobias as well as bring about negative emotions on the target of derogatory language. 
Moreover, it focuses on the evaluative properties of slurs and derogatives. The guiding 
questions for this section are: What are slurs and hate speech? What kind of evaluative 
properties – if any – do slurs have? What kind of emotional, psychological, and societal 
consequences do slurs and hate speech have? Should we regulate their usage by limiting 
freedom of speech?
– Emotions and Intersubjectivity – Typical Development and Pathologies
Developmental research has pointed to the emotional environment in which a child grows 
up as an indicator of how capable he or she would later be to enter in relation to others and 
to understand them (Kohut 1977; Stern 1990; 1985; Hofer 2006; 1981; Schore 1994; Bornemark 
2003). Emotions and intersubjectivity seem to be strongly linked from a developmental 
perspective. Thus, on the one hand, this section elaborates on this relation. On the other hand, 
this section focuses also on the relationship between emotions, emotional regulation, and 
pathologies – such as, Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD). 
Dieter Lohmar (Husserl-Archiv der Universität zu Köln) opens the section Theories of emotions 
with his invited paper “Emotions as a Multi-modal System of Representation in Non-linguistic 
Thinking”. In this paper, Lohmar claims that emotions can carry meaning, evaluations, 
knowledge, experience and sometimes also plans for the future. For this reason, he believes 
they can function as part of non-linguistic thinking. He thus investigates the function of 
emotions as an important part of an effective system of thinking and deciding that does not 
use the concepts of language but visual scenes combined with feelings.
In her invited paper, “Is the Perceptual Model of Emotions Still A Good Competitor? A Small 
Phenomenology of Feeling”, Roberta De Monticelli (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan) 
defends a version of the Perceptual Model of feeling, according to which feeling is the mode 
of presence of axiological aspects of reality, or values. After considering the objections to 
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this Model, she presents an intentional analysis of feeling as the core of all emotions, more 
generally of all the phenomena of affective life, for which she proposes a taxonomy. She 
also presents a special phenomenology of the consciousness that feels and of the degrees of 
intuitive cognition of values which may be distinguished in it. Finally, she reconsiders the 
objections to the Perceptual Model in order to make sense of them, showing the extent to 
which they are valid, and the way to overcome them.
In “The Rationalities of Emotion”, Cecilea Mun (Independent Scholar) argues that emotions are 
rational in-themselves and that they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, 
and evaluatively rational. After discussing what it means for emotions to be rational or 
irrational in-themselves, she proposes a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions. 
Finally, she discusses some of the implications of this account.
In his paper “Emotional Intelligence as an Intellectual Virtue: Theoretical Analysis and 
Empirical Assessment”, Paul Poenicke (University of Buffalo) claims that virtue theory has 
long recognized the significance of emotion for cognition, yet little philosophical research 
has been dedicated to identifying an intellectual virtue related to emotion. According to the 
author, applying recent work in virtue epistemology reveals emotional intelligence (EI) to be 
an intellectual virtue. People who score high in EI better attend to epistemically-significant 
features of the environment, which could explain the significance of stakes for knowledge 
attribution. While testing did not confirm higher EI with stakes sensitivity (the hypothesis), 
study methods, including stakes vignettes, inadvertently caused the hypothesis to be 
disconfirmed.
The fifth paper of this section “Affectivity and Self-Displacement in Stein’s Early 
Phenomenology. On the Role of Self-Experience in Empathy” by Elisa Magrì (University 
College Dublin) focuses on the role of bodily self-displacement in Stein’s account of empathy, 
pointing out its relevance in the general dimension of affectivity. According to the author, 
Stein grounds empathy on a dynamic model of embodied self-experience, which shares 
significant similarities with Varela & Depraz’s neurophenomenology. However, Magrì argues 
that Stein’s view of empathy cannot be reduced to a naturalized phenomenological sense and 
that bodily self-displacement is pre-condition of a more complex disposition towards others as 
is in line with Ratcliffe’s theory of radical empathy.
Sandy Berkovski (Bilkent University) closes the section with his paper “A naturalist View 
of Humiliation”. The author argues that a naturalist analysis of humiliation begins with 
the notion of social interaction, a public encounter with other people. Interactions are an 
essential element in cooperation, a vital condition of survival and well-being. In the course 
of interaction, the person presents himself or herself as someone possessing the qualities 
necessary for successful cooperation. An act of humiliation is designed to inflict damage on the 
agent’s self-presentation. Any such damage would be a sign that the agent is not successful in 
conducting the given interaction. Such damage would tend to decrease of cooperative value of 
the humiliated individual and to decrease his or her chances of survival and reproduction.
The invited paper “Straight and Twisted Self-deception” by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti 
(University of Eastern Piedmont “Amedeo Avogadro”) opens the section Emotions, Morality, 
and Political Theory. The paper analyzes two different forms of self-deception – straight and 
twisted ones – claiming that they are both actual cases of self-deception, even though the way 
to account for them is not a unitary one, as in Mele. The paper critically examines the claim 
that in twisted self-deception the motivational state of the subject is dominated by emotions. 
Galeotti, thus, proposes an alternative explanation of self-deception in which emotions – 
together with wishes – play a role in both types of self-deception.
In his invited paper “Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’”, Edward Harcourt 
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(Oxford University, Keble College Oxford) considers a ‘micro’ thesis on shame and guilt 
and a ‘macro’ thesis on self-regulation. According to the former thesis, shame and guilt are 
equally other-dependent. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a 
mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral 
consciousness. As for the ‘macro’ thesis, the author argues that the other-dependent view of 
self-regulation usually ascribed to children can also be found in adults. So that, if one assumes 
that only the moral consciousness of typical adults can be well-functioning, then there is all 
the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness 
can go together. If other-dependence can generally be a characteristic of our self-regulatory 
mechanisms when they function well – the paper’s ‘macro’ thesis –, then there is all the more 
reason to accept the paper’s ‘micro’ thesis – that other-dependence can characterize the well-
functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of 
other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence.
In her paper “Caring about an Ethics of Care: A New Dimension”, Maria Giovanna Bevilacqua 
(University of Italian Switzerland) wonders whether ethics of care could provide a useful tool 
to understand some of the contemporary issues in our societies. In order to do so, she focuses 
on some themes that ethics of care underlines – namely, the responsiveness of the moral 
subject for others’ needs and the difference between concrete other and generalized other.
Gian Paolo Terravecchia’s (University of Padua) paper – “Social Stances, Emotions and 
the Importance of Fear” – presents five main social stances: to refuse, to suffer, to accept, 
to assent, and to make something one’s own. According to the author, they all depend on 
different types of relationship between an interior attitude and an exterior manifestation. The 
second main contribution of the paper consists in a discussion of fear and its relationships to 
social stances. Studying emotions helps to stress the similarities and the differences between 
social stances and emotions, and among social stances themselves. The paper gives an example 
of how ethics can be enlightened by the tools of social philosophy.
Robin Jeshion (University of Southern California) opens the section Emotions, Language, 
and Hate Speech with her invited paper “Slur Creation, Bigotry Formation: the Power of 
Expressivism”. In this paper, Jeshion presents two novel problems to be added in the current 
debate on slurs. The Slur Creation Problem: How do terms come to be slurs? An expression ‘e’ 
is introduced into the language. What are the mechanisms by which ‘e’ comes to possess 
properties distinctive of slurs? The Bigotry Formation Problem: Speakers’ uses of slurs are a 
prime mechanism of bigotry formation, not solely bigotry perpetuation. With a use of a slur, 
how are speakers able to introduce new bigoted attitudes and actions toward targets? She 
concludes by arguing that expressivism offers powerful resources to solve the problems.
In his paper “Slurs: Semantic Content, Expressive Content and Social Generics”, Federico Cella 
(Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan) discusses the thesis that the offensiveness of 
slurs is related to the semantic encoding of stereotypes in their meaning. As noticed by Robin 
Jeshion, the stereotypical strategies do not seem to provide a satisfactory analysis of slurs’ 
functional traits. For this reason, Cella proposes to modify her view by making a distinction 
between two offensive dimensions of slurs: a negative expressive component encoded in the 
semantic content and directed toward a certain group of individuals, and the social generics 
related to that group conveyed as conversational implicatures.
In her paper “Not All Slurs are Equal”, Mihaela Popa-Wyatt (LOGOS, University of Barcelona) 
argues that, in contrast with the standard view that slurs convey contempt based on group-
membership, slurs are not a unitary group. In order to defend her thesis, she analyses two 
dimensions of variation among derogatives supporting the thesis that contempt based on 
group-membership doesn’t cover all the data.
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In the fourth paper of this section – “Building Evaluation into Language” –, Bianca Cepollaro 
(Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa and Institut Jean Nicod, Paris) spells out the conditions for a 
uniform analysis of thick terms and slurs. The main claim is that thick terms and slurs convey 
evaluations via presupposition and represent a device through which language implicitly 
conveys linguistically encoded evaluations. 
In their paper “Slurs and Negation”, Francesca Panzeri (University of Milan-Bicocca) and 
Simone Carrus (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan) present the results of two 
experimental studies. The first study aims at establishing whether the offensive component 
of slurs exhibits nondisplaceability. Data show that the derogatory content survives in 
conditionals and questions (supporting a pragmatic approach), and diminishes in indirect 
reports (in line with presuppositional accounts). Surprisingly, the offensiveness of slurs 
results almost nullified in negated sentences. In the second study, the authors explored 
the hypothesis that negated slurs were rated as not offensive because the negation was 
interpreted as metalinguistic.
“Silencing Speech with Pornography” by Laura Caponetto (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, 
Milan) closes this section. The aim of this paper is to offer a map of the dynamics through 
which pornography may silence women’s illocutions. Drawing on Searle’s speech act theory, 
the author takes illocutionary forces as sets of conditions for success. According to her thesis, 
the different types of silencing originate from the hearer’s missed recognition of a specific 
component of the force of the speaker’s act. She concludes by suggesting another kind of 
silencing produced by the failure to acknowledge the speaker’s words as serious (seriousness 
silencing).
The final section of this volume, Emotions and Intersubjectivity – Typical Development 
and Pathologies, is opened by the invited contribution by Thomas Fuchs (University of 
Heidelberg): “Intercorporeality and Interaffectivity”. According to phenomenological and 
enactive approaches, human sociality does not start from isolated individuals, but from 
intercorporeality and interaffectivity. To elaborate this concept, the paper introduces a 
concept of embodied affectivity, regarding emotions as a circular interaction of the embodied 
subject and the situation with its affective affordances. This leads to a concept of embodied 
interaffectivity as a process of coordinated interaction, bodily resonance, and ‘mutual 
incorporation’, which provides the basis for primary empathy. Finally, developmental 
accounts point out that these empathic capacities are also based on an intercorporeal memory 
that is acquired in early childhood.
In their invited article “Emotion Dysregulation in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Literature 
Review”, Cesare Maffei (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan) and Viola Fusi (Vita-Salute 
San Raffaele University, Milan) propose a review of the literature with the aim of describing 
the state of the art related to emotion dysregulation in Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD) patients and to illustrate a possible descriptive model. Besides the absence of a general 
consensus, the authors claim that there is a general agreement in understanding emotional 
dysregulation both as affective instability and as a frequent recourse to dysfunctional 
regulation strategies. The latter is what emotion dysregulation is from an operational point of 
view. The descriptive model explained in this paper is a possible way to bridge the conceptual 
and operative views of emotion dysregulation in BPD.
The paper by Flavia Felletti (University of Barcelona) – “What Autism Can Tell Us about the 
Link between Empathy and Moral Reasoning?” – discusses the relationship between empathy 
and moral reasoning among people with autism. By discussing the specific deficit that can 
be found in autism and by providing some experimental data, the author supports the thesis 
that, unlike typically developed, people with autism have difficulties in perspective-taking. 
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Moreover, she concludes that studies on autism do not help to assess the influence of the 
affective components of empathy on moral reasoning.
In her paper “Extended Affectivity as the Cognition of Primary Intersubjectivity”, Laura 
Candiotto (University of Edinburgh) explains why the distributed cognition model is the most 
convenient to understand the collective and the subjective dimension of extended affectivity. 
She proposes extended affectivity as the cognition of primary intersubjectivity after 
considering both the primordial affectivity approach and the extended emotions theory. She 
claims that the novelty of extended affectivity as the cognition of primary intersubjectivity 
consists in the recognition of the protocognitive valence of affectivity. 
The last paper of this section – “On the constructive role of conflicting emotions: The case 
of early mother-child interaction and its relevance for the study of social behavior” – by 
Roberta Patalano (Parthenope University) defines a preliminary basis for a dialogue between 
philosophy and psychoanalysis on the topic of emotional conflict. The author argues that the 
interaction between mother and child in the latter’s first year of life represents a privileged 
vertex of observation for the positive effects that can be produced by coping with emotional 
ambivalence, both on the quality of the relationship and on the development of the child. 
Furthermore, tolerance for emotional conflict not only contributes to the development of the 
Self in the infant, but it also favors the acquisition of prosocial attitudes, such as the capacity 
for concern, authenticity, and creativity.
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REFERENCES
Bornemark, J. (2013), “The Genesis of Empathy in Human Development: A Phenomenological 
Reconstruction”, Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 259–268;
Frijda, N. H. (1986), The Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York/
Melbourne/Paris;
——— (1988), “The Laws of Emotion”, American Psychologist, Vol. 43, No. 5, pp. 349–358;
Gallagher, S. (2001), “The Practice of Mind. Theory, Simulation, or Primary interaction?”, in 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 8, No. 5-7, pp. 83-107;
Goldie, P. (2000), The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Oxford University Press, New York;
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D. (2001), “An fMRI 
Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment”, Science, Vol. 293, No. 5537, pp. 
2105-2108;
Hofer, M. A. (1981), The Roots of Human Behavior: An Introduction to the Psychobiology of Early 
Development, Freeman, New York;
Acknowledgments
17
THE EMOTIONS: FROM THE (INTER)PERSONAL TO THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION
——— (2006), “Psychobiological Roots of Early Attachment”, Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 84–88;
Kohut, H. (1977), The Restoration of the Self, International Universities Press, Madison;
Nussbaum, M. C. (2001), Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge;
Prinz, J. (2004), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, Oxford University Press, New York;
Schore, A. N. (1994), Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional 
Development, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, Hillsdale;
Stern, D. N. (1985), The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and 
Developmental Psychology, Karnac Books, London;
——— (1990), Diary of a Baby. What Your Child Sees, Feels, And Experiences, BasicBooks, New York;
Whiting, D. (2011), “The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions”, 
European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 281–303;
Zahavi, D. (2014), Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
